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President Siles was compelled to announce elections for July  1985, one year 
ahead of schedule.  A final attempt at stabilization came in February  1985, 
with a program that prompted a domestic march to La Paz and a month-long 
sit-in  by  10,000  miners.  Again  the  government  capitulated  to  popular 
demands, after which it gave up even the pretense of attempting to stabilize 
before the arrival of  a new government in August. 
7  Ending the Hyperinflation, 
1985-88 
The end of the  hyperinflation  came swiftly, just three  weeks after the new 
government  of  Victor  Paz  Estenssoro  took  office.  A  comprehensive  sta- 
bilization  program,  labelled  the  New  Economic  Policy,  was  unveiled  on 
29 August  1985, and within days, the hyperinflation  ended. Later in  1985, 
after several weeks of low inflation, there was another sharp run-up in prices 
associated with a large emission of money at the end of the year, but this blip 
in inflation was quickly brought under control in mid-January  1986. 
7.1  The New Economic Policy 
The main  features of  the New  Economic  Policy  are shown in table 7.1. 
Note the program embraced widespread liberalization of trade and finance, as 
well  as fiscal austerity.  In principle,  the  stabilization measures are “short- 
term”  measures,  while  the  liberalization  measures  are  oriented  toward 
“long-run”  growth.  In fact, as we discuss  later, the  Bolivian  government 
believes,  with considerable reason, that the liberalization measures played  a 
key role in permitting the stabilization policies to take hold. 
The  key  stabilization  measures  (putting  aside,  for  the  moment,  the 
question  of  liberalization policies)  had  four  basic  elements,  two  of  which 
were  to  be  implemented  immediately  and  two  of  which  were  slated  for 
implementation in the months following the beginning of the program. First, 
the  government  committed  itself  to  a  policy  of  a  unified  exchange rate, 
without  capital  controls  or  exchange  controls.  The  exchange  rate  was 
initially  floated,  though with  a maximum  value of  the peso beyond  which 
peso appreciation would not be permitted,  and then was managed in a dirty 
float during the  following year.  Second, the  fiscal deficit  was  immediately 
reduced  through  a  combination  of  (a)  public  sector price  increases,  es- 
pecially  for petroleum products; (b) a public sector wage freeze; (c) further 239  BolividChapter 7 
Table 7.1 
Policy Area  Key Policy Initiatives  Implementation 
Outline of  Major Policy Initiatives in First Year of New  Economic Policy 
Exchange rate 
Public sector pricing 
Consolidated public sector 
budget 
Import regulations 
Private sector salaries and 
employment 
Private sector pricing 








Unification of  exchange rate on 
current and capital account; free 
convertibility of foreign exchange 
Public sector prices (most 
importantly, energy and food) 
raised to world levels 
Target deficit of  6.3 percent GNP, 
of which 5.3 percent to be 
externally financed 
Unification of tariffs to flat 20 
percent rate; elimination of 
trade quotas and nontariff barriers 
Elimination of government 
restrictions covering private 
wages, except for national 
minimum wage; removal of 
restrictions on hiring and firing 
Elimination of  all price controls, 
except for public transportation 
and public utilities; elimination 
of previous monopolies in 
intercity transport 
Successive wage freezes (with 
one-step increases between 
freeze periods) during 
August-December  1985, 
December-June  1986, 
June-December  1986 
Employment reductions in state 
enterprises and central 
administration 
enterprises 
Decentralization of  major state 
Increases in taxes paid by YPFB 
Major consolidation and reform of 
internal taxes; establishment of 
VAT,  patrimony taxes, and 
uniform income taxes 
Negotiation of IMF standby 
agreement 
Reestablishment of 
creditworthiness with World 
Bank and IDB 
rescheduling 
Negotiation of Paris Club 
Commercial bank debt 
Elimination of  restrictions on 
commercial bank interest rates 
Completed 1985 
Completed 1985 
Budget approved by Congress, 
May 1986 
Quotas eliminated immediately; 
tariff reform, August 1986 




Most actions not taken 
In effect 
Approved by Congress, 
May 1986 
Approved by  IMF, June  1986 
Current on all obligations 
Terms of agreement approved, 
Negotiations extended beyond 
Completed  1985 
June  1986 
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reduction  in  spending on public  investment; and  (d) budget  austerities in 
other  areas,  such  as  subsidized credits  to  the  private  sector.  Third,  the 
program called for a tax reform to reestablish and broaden the tax base. The 
reform was enacted by Congress nine months after the start of the program, 
and implementation began one year after. Fourth, the government announced 
its intentions of  reestablishing the country’s creditworthiness with  interna- 
tional  financial  institutions (official  and  private),  especially the  IMF,  the 
World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, while maintaining 
a suspension of  payments to the commercial banks. Renewed creditworthi- 
ness  required  the  government  to  eliminate  arrears  on  its  debt-servicing 
obligations to the international institutions and to negotiate an IMF standby 
agreement,  which  it  did  by  June  1986. In  June  1986,  a  Paris  Club  re- 
scheduling was obtained. As  described in chapter 8, Bolivia entered into a 
novel debt repurchase agreement with its commercial bank creditors in 1988. 
To  appreciate the  drama of  the  end  of  the  hyperinflation, consider the 
situation on the eve of  the new program. During August  1985, the official 
exchange rate  stood  at  67,000  pesos  per  dollar,  while  the  black-market 
exchange  rate  was  approximately  1.1  million  pesos  per  dollar,  for  a 
percentage gap of  some 1,600 percent (in fact, after averaging  1.1 million 
for most of the month, the black-market rate shot up to 1.5 million pesos on 
the eve of the program announcement). The internal price of petroleum was 
about 3 cents per liter, compared with  a world price of  28 cents per liter. 
Inflation in the weeks leading up to the program was (at weekly rates): 
August 5-11:  18.4 
August 12-18:  8.6 
August 19-25  6.1 
August 26September 1:  19.9 
As the program began, the exchange rate was allowed to depreciate freely, 
before a new de facto peg was set. The market set the new unified rate at an 
opening level of  about 1.1 million, giving a one-day dcprcciation of  1,600 
percent  relative  to  the  previous  official  rate.  Internal  oil  prices  were 
immediately raised to 28 cents per liter, or by  833 percent. All other price 
controls in the economy were lifted by  the decree of  29 August 1985. 
These enormous changes took  only  ten  days to  work through  the price 
system. Prices jumped immediately following the devaluation and increase 
in  internal energy prices, but then inflation abruptly ended: 
September 2-8:  36.8 
September 9-  15:  -4.6 
September 16-22:  -  .8 
September 23-29:  -  2.5 
September 30-October  6:  .7 
These data are reproduced in figure 7.1, where the remarkable break in the 
inflation from the second week of  the program onward is clearly evident. 241  BolividChapter 7 
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Fig. 7.1  Weekly inflation rates (week 0 = 8/26-9/1) 
The inflation rate remained at relatively low levels during the following year, 
with the exception of  a jump in prices during December 1985 and January 
1986, following policy mistakes in monetary management at the end of  1985 
(which  resulted  in  a  cabinet  reshuffling  and  the  reinforcement  of  fiscal 
austerity measures). 
The leading trade union organization, the COB, which had opposed and 
mobilized  against  similar-indeed  less  dramatic-policy  packages  in  the 
past, called for a general strike in opposition to the program. But after three 
years of  accelerating inflation and  the near chaos of  early  1985, the new 
government clearly had the upper hand. A state of  siege was declared (as a 
temporary  and  constitutional  emergency  procedure),  and  the  strike  was 
quickly disbanded, after which the state of  siege was cancelled. 
The stabilization of  the exchange rate at the new depreciated level of  1.1 
million  pesos per  dollar caused  a  gradual rebuilding of  the  public's  real 
money  balances.  One  of  the  central  policy  issues  at  the  end  of  a 
hyperinflation  is  how  that  increase  in  real  money  demand  should  be 
accommodated-through  domestic credit expansion to the public sector or to 
the  private  sector  (e.g.,  via  rediscounting  of  private  paper),  or  through 
foreign reserve inflows through the balance of payments (i.e., Central Bank 
purchases  of  foreign exchange at  a pegged  rate  or in  a dirty  float). The 
Bolivian government chose the third, and clearly most conservative, strategy 
of  relying on the balance of  payments. It was felt that with large Bolivian 
hoards  of  U.S. dollars,  both  in Bolivia  and  abroad,  there  was  sufficient 
availability of foreign exchange holdings in the private sector to provide the 242  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
basis  for the needed expansion of  the domestic money  supply. Moreover, 
with confidence in the peso likely to be a rising function of  the extent of 
foreign  reserve  backing  of  the  domestic  money  base,  the  conservative 
approach was felt to be the most consistent with a restoration of  confidence 
in the new  exchange rate and monetary regime. Net reserves climbed from 
approximately $63 million at the end of  August 1985 to about $150 million 
by  the end of  December, exceeding the rise in  the money base  from $64 
million in August to $1 12 million at the end of  the year. 
We  have already noted the sharp rise in government revenue collection as 
soon as the program started (see fig. 6.1). The rise in  domestic oil prices 
plus the renewed YPFB  tax  payments on export earnings alone raised the 
rate of central government tax collection by about 7 percent of GNP. Adding 
in  a  small  recovery  of  internal  taxes  and  tariff  collections,  government 
revenues  rose  from about  1.3 percent of  GNP during January-September 
1985 to  10.3 percent of GNP during the remainder of  the year. Overall, the 
central  administration  moved  into  a  cash-flow  surplus  during  October- 
December  1985. With a virtual elimination of domestic credit expansion to 
the fiscal sector, seignorage dropped off sharply after the program began (as 
was evident in fig. 6.1). Expressed as a percentage of GNP, the evolution of 
seignorage on a quarterly basis is: 
1985:l  2.9%  1985:4  1.9% 
1985:2  3.6%  19861  .l% 
1985:3  3.4%  1986:2  .8% 
Shortly after the stabilization program was announced, Bolivia faced the 
strong  challenge  of  shocks  to  the  external  sector.  Bolivian  exports  had 
depended  heavily  on  three  items  in  recent  years.  Tin  and  natural  gas 
constituted about 90 percent of Bolivia’s measured and legal exports, while 
processed coca leaf,  to become cocaine,  represented the third  (illegal and 
unrecorded) export. The rough estimates for Bolivian exports in  1985 are: 
Tin  $  150 million 
Other metals  $  81 million 
Natural gas  $  377 million 
Others  $  22 million 
Coca based  $  600 million 
Total  $1,230 million 
(approx. 31% of  GNP) 
Once the stabilization program got started, there were profound disruptions 
in all three of the major markets. The price of tin collapsed by  60 percent at 
the end of  October 1985, as the worldwide tin cartel crumbled in  financial 
distress. Three months later, hydrocarbon prices collapsed, forcing a renego- 
tiation of Bolivia’s natural gas contracts with Argentina and resulting in a loss 
of dollar earnings on the order of $75- 100 million (the exact value is difficult 243  BoliviaKhapter 7 
to compute because of a complicated barter arrangement between the two 
countries as part of  the  gas agreement). Finally, the Bolivian government 
began  an interdiction effort against narcotics trafficking in  the summer of 
1986, disrupting the  smuggling of  coca-based products from the country; 
and, at the same time, the world price for coca paste fell sharply. A con- 
servative estimate would  put  the  terms-of-trade loss  on  the  order  of  10 
percent of GDP. 
The shortfall in  export earnings threatened the stabilization program in 
several ways.  Most  importantly, the  export  shortfall resulted  in  a  sharp 
contraction in  living standards, which  is attributed to  a significant extent 
within Bolivia to the effects of the stabilization program itself. With great 
weakness in the domestic demand for nontradable goods as a result of the 
decline in national income, there was enormous political pressure to revive 
government spending, increase public wages, and  ‘  ‘reactivate” the  econ- 
omy. Second, each episode of export shortfall provoked public expectations 
of  a  devaluation and  helped  to  maintain  high  short-term nominal  peso 
interest rates as a result of  continued speculation against the exchange rate. 
After the tin price collapse in October 1985, the exchange rate was, in fact, 
allowed to depreciate by  almost 50 percent over a period of  two months. 
After the collapse of world petroleum prices, the authorities pegged the peso 
exchange rate, despite skepticism of  the public, who speculated heavily on a 
depreciation. Similarly, after the start of  the drug interdiction effort in the 
summer of  1986, the  public  again  speculated  heavily  against  the  peso, 
pushing up short-term peso interest rates once more and converting domestic 
currency holdings into dollars at the rate pegged by the Central Bank. Once 
again,  the  authorities resisted  a  currency devaluation, but  at  the  cost  of 
further months of high ex post real interest rates. 
7.2  Interpreting the Rapid Success at Price Stabilization 
In  his  rightly  celebrated  and  influential  analysis  of  the  ends  of  four 
hyperinflations,  Sargent  (1982)  stressed  that  hyperinflations  end  when 
governments “change the rules of the game” regarding budget deficits and 
money creation. Sargent argues: 
In each case that we have studied, once it became widely understood that 
the government would not rely on the central bank for its finances, the 
inflation terminated and the exchanges stabilized. . . . [tlhe changes that 
ended the hyperinflations were  not  isolated restrictive actions within a 
given  set  of  rules  of  the  game  or  general  policy.  Earlier  attempts to 
stabilize the exchanges in Hungary under Hegedus, and also in Germany, 
failed precisely because they did not change the rules of  the game under 
which fiscal policy had to be conducted. (89-90) 
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At  a trivial level,  Sargent is certainly correct that  without  a change in 
budget practices, no noninflationary exchange rate management would have 
been successful for long in Bolivia. Sargent’s real assertion is much deeper, 
however, in suggesting that the end of the hyperinflation occurs suddenly not 
just because the inflationary budget or monetary practices change, but also 
because the public expects and understands that these changes will persist. In 
other words, the rapid end of the hyperinflation is a signal of a restoration of 
confidence. At  this  level,  we  believe that  the  Bolivian  experience is  not 
strongly  supportive of  Sargent’s view,  in  that  the  evidence suggests that 
stabilization  proceeded  well  ahead  of  a  complete  restoration  of  public 
confidence. 
In  our  interpretation,  fixing  the  exchange  rate  was  nearly  a  sufficient 
condition for a short-run stabilization because so much of pricing was tied to 
the nominal exchange rate.  Moreover, it  was possible to  fix  the exchange 
rate in the short run despite the fact that the public lacked confidence in the 
ability  of  the  government  to  Jix  the  rate  in  the  long  run.  A  temporary 
stabilization of the exchange rate was feasible because the Central Bank was 
willing to commit at least some international reserves (e.g., Bolivia’s gold 
reserves) to pegging  the exchange rate  in  the short term  and  because the 
emergency measures  allowed  the  government to  temporarily not  have  to 
resort to money creation. 
Almost at the moment of  stabilization, Central Bank credits to the public 
sector stopped rising, as revenues jumped in response to the higher domestic 
prices of petroleum products. During October and November 1985, increases 
in  the  money  supply  were  due  to  increases in  Central Bank  holdings of 
foreign exchange reserves. The exchange rate stabilized at 1.1 million pesos 
per dollar, leading almost immediately to price stabilization. (Actually, the 
government did not peg the exchange rate, but rather intervened to prevent 
the rate from appreciating above the 1.1 million level. Given the pressures 
toward appreciation as  households started to rebuild real money balances, 
the one-sided peg of  the exchange rate worked as if  the government were 
actually pegging the rate.) 
Before showing the evidence that inflationary expectations were slow to 
decline, let us  consider some reasons why we should not be surprised that 
expectations  did  not  shift  dramatically  upon  the  announcement  of  the 
program.  First,  the stabilization program was  the seventh attempt in four 
years  and  was  being  carried  out  by  a  president  without  a  majority  in 
Congress and with a direct electoral mandate of  less than 30 percent of  the 
voters.  Second,  the  program  promised  many  reforms  that  would  take  a 
considerable amount of time to negotiate and implement. Third, the program 
reflected a radical change from the past policies of the president’s own party 
(which, as the vanguard of the Revolution of  1952, did not have a tradition 
of  laissez-faire economics),  and  so could  not  be  counted on  to  win  the 
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Fourth, there were profound unknowns at the time of  stabilization. The 
overhang of  foreign debt  remained crushing,  and  the  stabilization in  the 
intermediate run would remain possible only with  new  foreign funds from 
the official creditors. But would the IMF consent to a program without the 
immediate resumption of interest payments to the commercial banks? Would 
the Paris Club respond with generous debt rescheduling terms? Internally, the 
situation was as murky. Under Siles, the central administration had reneged 
on  many  financial  commitments  to  regional  governments.  Would  those 
claims  by  the  regional entities  now  be  honored,  thereby  threatening the 
solvency  of  the  central  government?  Would  tax  reform  measures  be 
implemented? Would the unions be able to crush this stabilization program 
as they had, in part, the early ones? As of 9 September 1985, there were no 
budget  accounts,  reliable  tax  forecasts,  or  even  statistics  on  Bolivia’s 
international reserve holdings (the data were in a mass of confusion because 
of  several complications with bilateral payments arrangements with Argen- 
tina).  There  was  simply  no  basis  for  an  informed  opinion  about  the 
longer-term prospects of stabilization. 
7.2.1 
We  have suggested that the hyperinflation ended immediately because of 
the stability and unification of  the exchange rate,  even though inflationary 
expectations,  at  least  regarding  the  intermediate  run,  did  not  drop 
instantaneously. In other words, the program was successful even though the 
measures  were  not  immediately  credible.  The  key  to  this  seemingly 
paradoxical view, we have suggested, is the fact that it is possible to peg an 
exchange rate in the short run, even if there are widespread expectations that 
the exchange rate will collapse in the future. There is one excellent source of 
evidence on exchange rate  expectations, and that  is from nominal interest 
rates on peso- and dollar-denominated assets in La Paz in the aftermath of 
the stabilization. Nominal peso interest rates remained extraordinarily high 
during much of  the year after the beginning of stabilization. Nominal interest 
rates fell after the stabilization program began, but only gradually and with a 
long  lag  in  response to  the end  of  currency depreciation.  Some data on 
nominal lending rates are shown in table 7.2. 
Under  the  deregulated financial system  in  place  since the  stabilization 
program  began,  loans  could  be  contracted in  either  dollars or pesos,  at 
unregulated interest rates. The spread between peso- and dollar-denominated 
borrowing  reflects  mainly  the  expected  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  peso 
vis-A-vis  the  U.S. dollar. Note  that  despite the  sudden cessation of  price 
increases in September 1985, nominal interest rates in pesos remained on the 
order of 20 percent per month from October 1985 to March 1986, compared 
with dollar-denominated interest rates of  1% to  2  percent per month. The 
expectations of  continued currency depreciation proved  to  be  appropriate 
during December  1985 and January  1986, when policy  mistakes led  to a 
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Table 7.2  &  and Dollar-Denominated Thirty-day  Loan Rates, April 1985-0ctober 
1986 (beginning of month) 
Ex Post  Excess 
Dollar Rate  cost of 
















































































Note:  The ex post dollar rate on a peso loan is calculated at (1 +  i,)&/E,+, ,  where E, is the beginning-of-month 
exchange rate (pesos per dollar) and i, is the beginning-of-month  f  interest rate. 
"Last week of October. 
sharp depreciation of the peso. However, from February to September 1986, 
the interest rates remained extraordinarily high (see table 7.2), despite the 
absence of  any further currency depreciation. Thus, it is clear from the data 
that there was not  a decisive restoration of  confidence in  the  peso at the 
beginning  of  the  program,  despite  the fact  that  ex  post,  the  stabilization 
succeeded. 
Similar  evidence  against  an  instantaneous  recovery  of  confidence  is 
offered  by  the  time  path  of  real  money  balances  in  the  wake  of  the 
stabilization program.  Holdings of  real  balances increased only gradually 
during  1986 and remained significantly below  historical levels throughout 
the year. 
7.3  Was  the Stabilization Recessionary? 
The evidence on  the  recessionary effect of  the  program  is ambiguous, 
since during  the  year  of  the  stabilization program  the  economy was  hit 
remarkably hard by  a series of  external shocks, whose overall effect was a 
loss of export earnings on the order of  10 percent of GNP. Such an enonnous 247  BolividChapter 7 
loss of export earnings would normally be enough to create a deep recession, 
even in  an economy starting from a position of  macroeconomic stability. 
Moreover, during 1981  -85,  measured real GDP had declined every year, by 
2.9 percent  on  average, so that  the  continuing economic  stagnation and 
falling GNP in  1986 could  not  in  any  event be  attributed  easily to  the 
stabilization program. 
In the event, GDP fell by  2.9 percent in  1986, but then began rising in 
1987 and  1988 (by an estimated 2.3 and 3.0 percent, respectively), despite 
the  sharp  fall  in  the  terms  of  trade.  There  is  absolutely  no  evidence, 
therefore, that the effects of stabilization were in any way contractionary-if 
at all-for  more than a very brief period. 
It  should  be  stressed  in  any  event that  the  “austerity”  fiscal actions 
undertaken in ending a hyperinflation are not necessarily contractionary on 
balance,  since  the  contractionary effects  of  a  rise  in  tax  revenues  are 
balanced by  the expansionary effects of  the elimination of the inflation tax. 
Basically, the stabilization program does not involve a rise in overall taxes, 
but rather a shift from one tax  (the inflation tax) to other, more efficient 
taxes. In addition, the reduction in uncertainty and the elimination of  price 
distortions brought about by the stabilization program should have important 
supply-side effects. 
Moreover, the  stabilization program made possible a restoration of  net 
inflows  of  financial  assistance  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  Thus,  the 
stabilization measures significantly eased the  national budget constraint, if 
account is taken of the hundreds of millions of dollars of financial assistance 
that were made available by  the IMF,  the World  Bank,  the Inter-American 
Development Bank,  and the bilateral creditors as a result of  the success of 
the  stabilization program. We  have noted  in chapter  1 that as a result of 
stabilization, the  net  resource transfer shifted from a  significant negative 
amount (approximately 6 percent of  GNP net outflow in  1983) to a large 
positive amount in 1987 (approximately 5 percent of  GNP net inflow). 
One  possible  source of  contractionary impulses from  the  stabilization 
program has been the high real interest rates in Bolivia since the beginning 
of the stabilization. As noted by Dornbusch and Fischer (1986), high ex post 
real rates have been present in the aftermath of most hyperinflations because 
of  a scarcity of  money  as the demand for money  rises  sharply following 
stabilization. We  have suggested that the high interest rates reflect lingering 
inflationary expectations, and so do not necessarily signal high ex ante real 
interest rates. 
7.3  Further Lessons from the Hyperinflation 
We  conclude our discussion of  the hyperinflation by  discussing some of 
the  central  issues  that  have  been  debated  in  the  design  of  stabilization 
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topics in particular: the case for an “orthodox”  versus  “heterodox”  shock 
program,  and the linkages of  short-run macroeconomic  policy and long-run 
structural policies. 
7.3.1  Orthodox versus Heterodox Anti-Inflation  Programs 
Much of  the debate in Latin America in recent  years has centered on the 
question  of  the  appropriateness  of  “orthodox”  policies  in  ending  a  high 
inflation.  Advocates  of  the  “heterodox”  shock  approach  have argued  that 
tight  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  alone  are  insufficient  to  end  a  high 
inflation.  They suggest that incomes policies,  wage and price controls,  and 
even monetary  reform should play a central role in a stabilization program. ’ 
Extreme advocates of heterodoxy go even further: they suggest that orthodox 
policies have no role to play in inflation stabilization. In this view, inflation 
is  an  “inertial”  process,  in  which  prices  and  wages  rise  because  of  self- 
fulfilling  expectations.  The goal of  policy,  in  that  view,  is to break  those 
expectations through wage and price controls. 
The Bolivian  experience  sheds  some  light  on  this  debate, although  the 
lessons from Bolivia must be read with care. The most obvious point is that 
Bolivia  was  successful  in  stabilizing  inflation  without  recourse  to  any 
elements of heterodox wage or price policies.  There were no wage or price 
controls, and no monetary reform. Indeed, at the beginning of  the program, 
virtually  all  existing  price  controls  were  removed,  with  the  goal  of 
liberalizing the price system. 
In this sense, it is clear that orthodox policies were sufficient to end the 
hyperinflation.  And  as  already  indicated,  the  end  of  the  inflation  was 
virtually  instantaneous,  with  the  runaway  inflation  being  eliminated  in  a 
matter  of  a  couple of  weeks  and  remaining  low  for  several  years.  This 
success  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  failed  “heterodox”  plans  in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. In those countries,  inflation was held down by 
the  stabilization programs  for a few months, only  to explode at very  high 
rates after a short period of  time. 
The long-term success of the Bolivian program compared with the failures 
elsewhere  is  clearly  related  to  the  greater  fiscal  stabilization  achieved  in 
Bolivia,  and  thereby  in  the  lesser  recourse  to  money  financing  of  budget 
deficits.  The links  between  the  budget  deficits  and  inflation  in  all  of  the 
countries mentioned  is clear enough. Large deficits  are financed by money 
printing, which in turn causes a downward pressure on the foreign exchange 
rate.  If the exchange rate is allowed to depreciate,  then the domestic prices 
of  tradable  goods  (importables  and  exportables)  rise  in  line  with  the 
exchange rate depreciation.  If the exchange rate is pegged in order to avoid 
the inflationary  consequences of depreciation,  the central government  loses 
reserves over time, which eventually forces it to devalue the exchange rate, 
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Typically,  as  happened  in  Argentina,  Brazil,  Peru,  and  Bolivia  during 
1982-85,  the government tries to avoid outright depreciation or devaluation 
of the exchange rate, even as it runs out of reserves. Rather than devalue the 
official rate,  the government rations foreign exchange,  thereby  creating a 
spread  between  the  official  exchange  rate  and  the  “market”  (black  or 
parallel) rate. In the end, the inflationary consequences are the same as if  an 
official devaluation had occurred. On the margin, imports are purchased at 
the  highly  depreciated  black-market  rate,  so  that  the  internal  prices  of 
importables rise in step with the depreciated black-market rate, rather than 
the official exchange rate. Eventually, the gap between the official and the 
depreciated  black-market  rate  becomes  so  large  and  produces  so  much 
cheating  and  corruption  (in  the  form  of  overinvoicing  of  imports  and 
underinvoicing of exports, bribes to get Central Bank allocations of  foreign 
exchange, etc.) that the official exchange rate is grudgingly de~alued.~ 
Of  all of the high-inflation countries in Latin America in the  1980s, only 
Bolivia  after  1985 was  able to break this circle of  budget  deficits, depre- 
ciating currency, and high inflation. The orthodox tight monetary policies in 
Bolivia, made possible by  a major reduction in the budget deficit, was the 
key  that  allowed Bolivia  to  maintain  a  stable and  unified  exchange rate 
vis-8-vis  the  dollar.  In  other  countries,  the  large  budget  deficits  that 
continued after the stabilization programs were put in  place prevented the 
establishment of  a stable and  unified  exchange rate  for any period  longer 
than a few months. 
While  the  Bolivian  case  illustrates powerfully  the  need  for  significant 
budgetary adjustment, it does not really settle the case for or against wage 
and price policies in addition to  the more orthodox budgetary policies. In 
Bolivia, inflation stopped immediately without any additional “heterodox” 
pricing policies, but we should not make overly strong inferences from this. 
Part  of  the  Bolivian  experience  reflects  the  special  characteristics  of  a 
hyperinflation rather than a mere high inflation. 
In Bolivia, the inflation ended as soon as the exchange rate was stabilized 
because  the  preceding  hyperinflation  had  eliminated  all  long-term  price 
contracts  from  the  Bolivian  economy.  By  August  1985,  most  prices  in 
Bolivia were set on  a spot-market basis.  Often, the prices were quoted in 
dollars, with the Bolivian peso price being  determined by  the dollar price 
multiplied  by  the  black-market  exchange  rate  at  the  moment.  In  these 
circumstances, inflation is basically equal to the rate of  depreciation of the 
black-market exchange rate. If  the exchange rate can be stabilized, inflation 
will immediately revert to the rate of  increase of  dollar prices. Indeed, in 
early  September  1985,  the  exchange  rate  stopped  depreciating  and  the 
Bolivian inflation was over. 
In  other  countries,  however,  it  may  happen  that  the  exchange  rate  is 
stabilized but that  domestic prices continue to rise.  Such was the case of 250  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Chile during  1979-81.4  The  difference between  Bolivia  and  these  other 
cases seems to lie in  the nature of  hyperinflation, in  which all vestiges of 
long-term  pricing  in  the  domestic  currency  disappear.  For  less  rapid 
inflations, staggered price contracts denominated in the domestic currency, 
or backward-looking indexation to the domestic CPI, can break the tight link 
between inflation and the exchange rate. Thus, countries with high inflations 
but not hyperinflations might be wise to combine exchange rate stabilization 
with  other  pricing  measures  in  order  to  achieve  a  rapid  return  to  price 
stability. 
The  1985 Israeli stabilization is a clear example of  the combination of 
orthodox stabilization policies combined with elements of  “heterodoxy”  in 
order  to  achieve  a  rapid  disinflation.  As  in  Bolivia,  the  key  to  Israel’s 
stabilization program was a dramatic and sudden cut in the budget deficit. 
And  as  in  Bolivia,  the  stabilization  of  the  exchange  rate  provided  the 
“nominal anchor” in the stabilization, that is, the key price whose fixity was 
central to price stability throughout the economy. But in Israel, as opposed to 
Bolivia, the government also negotiated an  agreement with the Histadrut, the 
national  trade  union  movement,  which  called  for  a  short-term  freeze  of 
wages and prices. Notably, the union agreed to this freeze conditional on the 
continued stability  of  the nominal exchange rate. Thus, as in  Bolivia, the 
Israeli  stabilization was,  at  the  core,  built  upon  nominal  exchange  rate 
stability. 
7.3.2 
One of the continuing debates among economists and policymakers is the 
appropriate mix of  “stabilization”  policies (budget cutting, tight monetary 
policy,  etc.) with  “structural”  policies (trade liberalization, privatization, 
etc.).  Some  argue  that  stabilization should  precede  structural adjustment 
policies,  while others  say  that  the  stabilization and  structural adjustment 
policies should be pursued in parallel. Once again, the Bolivian case sheds 
some light on these arguments. 
The Bolivian stabilization program began with the remarkable presidential 
Supreme  Decree  2 1060,  which  instituted  a  wide-ranging  liberalization 
program  in  conjunction  with  the  short-run  stabilization  measures.  It  is 
important to understand the motivations for this joint action. To  a significant 
extent, to be sure, the designers of the stabilization program were aware that 
Bolivia  needed  to  undergo  major  structural  adjustments,  especially  to 
develop  new  export  markets,  in  order  to  compensate  for  the  long-term 
secular decline of  Bolivia’s major export, tin.  But the motivations for the 
liberalization  went  beyond  the  textbook  arguments  for  outward  trade 
orientation and an efficient allocation of resources. 
The designers of  the stabilization program  were aware of  the enormous 
administrative overload that Bolivia’s model of state capitalism had created. 
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The  state  sector  was  not  only  financially  bankrupt  but  administratively 
bankrupt  as well. There was  little administrative capacity to carry out the 
most  basic  functions  of  government,  much  less  to  implement a  refined 
program  of  industrial  policy  based  on  an  elaborate  scheme  of  price 
controls,  transfers,  and  subsidies. Price controls that  were  in  place  were 
haphazardly  enforced,  subject  to  enormous  corruption,  and  often  had 
bizarre  and  unintended  consequences.  Grain  subsidies,  for  example, 
resulted in  enormous smuggling of  flour to  neighboring  countries and the 
enrichment  of  millers,  rather  than  any  significant  benefit  to  the 
Significant  amounts  of  cheap  gasoline  were  being  smuggled  in  tanker 
trucks  across  the  border  with  Peru.  Cheap  credits  to  agriculture  were 
simply  fueling  the  black  market,  rather  than  creating  any  additional 
agricultural output. Under these circumstances, much of  the economy was 
already  de  facto liberalized,  with  many  prices-even  those  under  formal 
controls-effectively  being  determined by  world  market  conditions.  Price 
controls often had bizarre and regressive effects,  with  powerful  or clever 
middlemen  able  to  arbitrage the  gaps  between  official  prices  and  world 
prices. 
For these reasons, the liberalization of  prices was viewed as a basic part 
of  the short-term stabilization strategy, as  well as a part  of  the long-term 
development  strategy.  By  freeing  up  prices  and  withdrawing  from  the 
business  of  setting  a  wide  range  of  quotas  and  prices,  the  government 
therefore  hoped  to  accomplish  many  things:  to  free  top  government 
officials  to  focus  on  the  crucial  fiscal  measures  in  need  of  immediate 
implementation;  to  eliminate  many  of  the  costly  and  distributionally 
perverse  income  transfers  implicit  in  the  existing  system  of  price 
regulation; to  reduce the need  to monitor government policies,  so that the 
scarce administrative machinery could focus on tax  collection and budget 
cutting rather than on the administration of  a complicated system of  wage 
and  price  controls; and  finally, to  send the  right  price  signals needed  to 
encourage the movement of  resources into new tradables sectors. 
As  discussed  below,  the  long-term  structural  adjustment  to  the 
liberalization policies  is  still  in  the  early  phases,  despite  several  years 
of  stabilization.  While  there  has  been  some  rise  in  nontraditional 
exports,  there  have  still  not  developed  major  new  export  sectors  that 
can  compensate  for  the  collapse  of  tin  exports.  Bolivia  has  still  not 
generated  the  needed  internal  savings  to  finance  the  development  of  a 
major  new  export  sector,  and  external  savings  are  unlikely  to  make  up 
the difference in view  of  Bolivia’s enormously high  country risk.  At  the 
same time,  Bolivia remains  stuck  without  its  most  obvious new  market: 
Brazil. It is only very recently that Brazil has shown an interest in easing 
its  heavily  protectionist  policies  to  allow  an  increase  in  imports  from 
Bolivia. 